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Abstract

We examine ftrms' use of currency derivatives to in order to differentiate among ex isting theories
of hedging behavior. Firms with greater growth opportunities and tighter fmancial constraints are
more likely to use currency derivatives. This result suggests that fnms might use derivatives to
reduce cash flow variation that might otherwise preclude fnms from investing in valuable growth
opportunities. Firms with extensive foreign exchange-rate exposure and economies of scale in
hedging activities are also more likely to use currency derivatives. Finally, the source of foreign
exchange-rate exposure is an important factor in the choice among types of currency derivatives.
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Why Firms Use Currency Derivatives

Large U.S. corporations increasingly turn to derivatives to reduce their exposures to a
variety of risks.

The motives for this behavior are not well understood, and the empirical

evidence on the characteristics of derivatives users is limited.

However, theoretical research

provides sev eral explanations for optimal hedging that result from different types of capital market
imperfections.

To distinguish among these explanations, we examine the use of currency

derivatives for a sample of ftrms that have ex ante exposure to foreign exchange-rate risk. We
also consider how the magnitude of this exposure affects the level of benefits that can be realized
from reducing risk and the costs associated with risk reduction.
Our sample represents 372 of the Fortune 500 nonfmancial firms m 1990. All of our
sample fmns have potential exposure to foreign currency risk from foreign operations, foreigndenominated debt, or a high concentration of foreign competitors in their industries.
Approximately 41 percent of these ftrms use currency swaps, forwards, futures, options, or
combinations of these instruments.

We fmd that firms with greater growth opportunities and

tighter fmancial constraints are more likely to use currency derivatives. This result is consistent
with the notion that firms use derivatives to reduce the variation in cash flows or earnings that
might otherwise preclude frrms from investing in valuable growth opportunities (Shapiro and
Titman ( 1986), Lessard (1990), Stulz (1990) and Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993)).

The

underinvestment cost explanation for optimal hedging suggests that, contrary to recent media
hyperbole, derivatives may prov ide a valuable benefit to firms that use them rationally.
We also examine currency derivatives use for naturally-hedged firms, those with foreign
operations and foreign-denominated debt For this sample, research and development (R&D)
expenses and short-term liquidity are not significant determinants of currency derivatives use.
However, these variables are still significant determinants of derivatives use for frrms with foreign
operations but no foreign-denominated debt. These results suggest that foreign-denominated debt
and currency derivatives act as substitutes for hedg ing foreign operations.
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The likelihood of using currency derivatives also is positively related to foreign pretax
income and sales, and foreign-denominated debt. These results are consistent w ith our argument
that the benefits of hedging are greatest and the costs lowest for firms with extensive foreign
exchange-rate exposure.

Finally, larger firms and firms that use other types of derivative

instruments, including interest-rate-based and commodity-based derivatives, are more likely to use
currency derivative instruments, which suggests that economies of scale in costs are important
determinants of currency derivatives use.
Because we observe derivativ es use, not "hedging," our dependent variable might measure
speculation rather than hedging.

Therefore, we consider firms' motives in using currency

derivativ es to speculate and the implications of speculation for our results. Although we fmd that
some of our proxy variables are important determinants of both optimal speculation and optimal
hedging (such as fmn size), other frrm characteristics (such as those associated with
underinvestment costs) are unrelated to optimal speculative motives.

Therefore, although

currency derivatives use is not a direct measure of hedging, our results suggest that on average,
our sample firms are not speculating w ith currency deriv ative instruments.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I summarizes this paper's contribution to the
existing literature on derivatives use. Section II reviews the incentiv es for derivatives use and
discusses the effects of underlying exposure and costs of risk management on a fmn 's ultimate
hedging decision. Section III describes our sample and the collection of derivatives data. Section
IV reports univ ariate and logit tests of the determinants of the use of currency derivatives as well
as the results of robustness checks on those tests . We test the determinants of the choices among
types of derivativ e instruments in Section V. Section VI concludes.

I. Over view ofDeriva tives Use Studies

Our paper is one of the frrst cross-sectional studies to examme the determinants of
corporate deriv ativ es use by employing new annual report disclosures required by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board, rather than survey data. We contribute to the empirical literature
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through our sample construction and empirical methodology. Our sample of Fortune 500 fmns
with ex ante foreign exchange-rate exposure reduces noise in our empirical tests by excluding
ftrms that may have incentives to reduce variance, but do not have ex ante exposure. At the same
time, our sample retains cross-sectional variation in the fmn characteristics that are predicted to
be associated with optimal hedging. Thus, our results are applicable to a broad range of ftrms.
Other empirical studies have either used broad but unrestricted samples (Dolde (1993, 1995),
Nance, Smith and Smithson ( 1993), Mian (1996), and Francis and Stephan (1990)) or industryspecific samples (Schrand and Unal (1996), and Tufano (1996)).

By construction, industry-

specific studies diminish cross-sectional variation in ftrms ' risk exposures, but they do so at the
ex pense of cross-sectional variation in the potential incentives to hedge .
Our empirical tests also include a set of hypotheses that are more comprehensive than
those of empirical studies that use large cross-sectional samples.

We organize the various

theories into a single framework by discussing the incentives for derivatives use from the
perspectives of managers, bondholders, and equityholders. With this added structure, we are able
to identify fmn characteristics that have not been previously considered, and we are able to defme
our variables to match the testable implications of the theories.

In addition, by estimating

alternative specifications of our empirical models, we address issues of endogeneity related to a
ftrm's derivatives use, capital structure, and management compensation.

While we cannot

completely eliminate the problem of endogeneity, all our results are nevertheless robust to these
alternative specifications.
Finally, unlike other empirical studies, we extend the testable implications of extant
theories on derivatives use by considering how the cost of using derivatives affects the decision to
use them.

We fmd that fmns with the greatest economies of scale in implementing and

maintaining a risk management program are more likely to use currency derivatives. Moreover,
we fmd that the source of underlying exposure to foreign exchange-rate risk affects not only the
choice to use these derivatives, but also the choice among different types of instruments. For
example, foreign exchange-rate exposure resulting from foreign operations generally represents
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frequent short-term transactions in which the payment amount varies across transactions and is
not determined until the transaction is fmalized.

We find that fnms with currency exposure

resulting from foreign operations or import competition are more likely to use forwards only, or
forwards in combination with futures or options, than currency swaps. This fmding is consistent
with the notion that forward contracts and options provide a relatively low-cost method for
matching the payoffs of frequent and uncertain transactions.
In contrast, the foreign exchange-rate exposure associated with a foreign debt contract is

known at the inception of the contract. Thus, the exposure represents a relatively smaller number
of transactions with multiple, but certain, subsequent payments.

Consequently, a fnm can

implement a single long-term risk management strategy at the initiation of the debt contract.
Consistent with this argument, we fmd that fnms that use currency swaps or combinations of
swaps have relatively higher levels of foreign-denominated debt than fnms that use no currency
derivatives.

These results related to the choice of derivative instrument are consistent with

managers rationally hedging foreign exchange-rate exposure. This behavior, however, is often
questioned in the current debate over regulation of corporate derivatives use.

II. Theories ofDerivatives Use
Theories of optimal hedging demonstrate that capital market imperfections create
incentives for firms to use derivative instruments. While these imperfections might be necessary
for optimal derivatives use, they are not sufficient conditions.

We argue that given these

incentives, a firm' s ultimate decision to use derivatives also depends on the level of its exposure to
foreign exchange-rate risk. In addition, a frrm 's choice to use currency derivatives depends on the
costs of managing foreign exchange-rate risk. In this section, we propose proxies for the three
factors affecting a fum 's derivatives decision: the incentives to use derivatives, the exposure to
foreign exchange-rate risk, and the costs of implementing a derivatives strategy.
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A. Incentives for derivatives use
Managers: Smith and Stulz (1985) demonstrate that when a risk-averse manager owns a
large number of the firm's shares, his expected utility of wealth is significantly affected by the
variance of the firm 's expected profits.

The manager will direct the fum to hedge when he

believes that it is less costly for the firm to hedge the share price risk than it is for him to hedge
the risk on his own account. Consequently, Smith and Stulz predict a positive relation between
managerial wealth invested in the firm and the use of derivativ es.
We measure the managerial wealth derived from shares by the log of the market value of
common shares beneficially owned (excluding options) by officers and directors as a group
(MGRWLTH). Ideally, we would like a proxy which measures the percentage of total managerial
wealth invested in the fum; however, total managerial wealth is not observed. Using MGRWLTH
assumes that total managerial wealth is constant across managers in all fums and that the size of
the management team is constant across all firms. Table I presents the predicted signs of the
coefficient estimates for each proxy variable. The Appendix contains detailed defmitions and data
sources for each variable.

[Insert Table I here]

The expected utility of managerial wealth can be a convex function of the firm 's expected
profits when managers own unexercised options. In this case, managers can choose to increase
the risk of the fum in order to increase the value of their options. Assuming derivativ es are used
for hedging, Smith and Stulz predict a negative relation between option holdings and derivatives
use.
We measure managerial ownership of options (OPTS) by the log of the market value of
the shares obtainable by using outstanding options. These options are exercisable within 60 days
of the date for which managerial share ownership is reported in proxy statements. This represents
a crude proxy for convexity of the compensation function created by employee stock options.
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However, because we are unable to obtain information about the total number of options
outstanding, their exercise prices and expiration dates, we cannot determine if the options are inor out-of-the-money, or the amount of money at risk. The disincentives related to hedging are
greatest when the options are out-of-the-money .

Bondholders: Smith and Stulz ( 1985) also show that exogenous bankruptcy costs create
incentives for bondholders to support optimal hedging. By reducing the variance of a fum 's cash
flows (or accounting profits), hedging decreases the probability, and thus the expected costs, of
fmancial distress. These exogenous bankruptcy costs can include, for example, the costs related
to the deterioration or loss of long-term relationships with suppliers and customers (Shapiro and
Titman, 1986). We use two measures of borrowing capacity as proxies for a firm's pre-hedging
probability of financial distress: the interest coverage ratio (COV_AV) and the long-term debt
ratio (DE_AV). The lower a firm's coverage ratio and the higher its long-term debt ratio, the
greater the probability of fmancial distress. Consequently, the expected costs of financial distress
for those firms are greater, assuming that exogenous bankruptcy costs are constant across firms.
Therefore, the lower a frrm 's coverage ratio and the higher its long-term debt ratio, the more
likely the firm is to use derivativ es:;eteris paribus

2

The use of the long-term debt ratio as a proxy for expected fmancial distress costs is not
without controversy. In the interpretation above, we assume that a greater probability of fmancial
distress leads to greater expected costs.

We ignore the possibility that exogenous fmancial

distress costs might be an important determinant of a fum 's debt choice. For example, a fum with
high exogenous distress costs might choose a low long-term debt ratio. However, we address this
issue through extensive robustness checks. For example, we use a firm 's Standard & Poor' s
credit rating in place of its long-term debt ratio as a measure of expected distress costs. In
another robustness check, we assume that fums within specific industries have a common
exposure to distress and replace long-term debt ratios with industry-adjusted ratios.

We also

model the derivatives choice and debt choice simultaneously. The debt choice equation includes
firm characteristics that control for cross-sectional variation in exogenous financial distress costs.
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A hedging strategy will only reduce expected bankruptcy costs to the extent that the firm
can commit ex ante to following a hedging strategy after debt proceeds are received. Such a
commitment may be achieved directly through bond covenants. Alternatively, bondholders may
be able to infer that hedging is an optimal fum strategy in equilibrium for reasons unrelated to
reducing the costs of external financing. At least four of our sample firms disclosed in 1991 that
bond covenants or credit agreements require them to hedge some portion of their interest rate
ex posure.
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) formalize the Smith and Stulz fmancial distress
explanation for optimal hedging by endogenizing bankruptcy costs. Like Shapiro and Titman
(1986), Lessard ( 1990), and Stulz (1990), Froot et al. argue that without hedging, firms are more
likely to pursue suboptimal investment projects (Myers, 1977).

Hedging mitigates this

underinv estment problem by reducing not only the costs of obtaining external funds, but also a
firm's dependence on external fmancing. Therefore, we predict a positive association between
potential underinv estment costs and the benefits of hedging.
We use three variables as proxies for the growth opportunities available to a firm: RD is
the ratio of a firm's research and development expenditures to its sales; PPE is the ratio of a firm's
capital expenditures for property, plant, and equipment to firm size (SIZE), measured as the book
values of the fum 's debt and outstanding preferred stock plus the market value of the firm's equity;
and BM is the book value of a fum's common equity scaled by its market value.

The

underinvestment cost hypothesis, however, predicts that these costs result from the interaction of

both potential growth opportunities and costly external financing.

Thus, we create three

additional variables to measure underinvestment costs by interacting a firm's long-term debt ratio
multiplicatively with the three proxies for growth opportunities: RD, 1/BM, and PPE. We use the
inverse of a firm's book-to-market ratio (BM) so that there is a positive predicted relation
between each of these variables and deriv atives activ ity.
Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) argue that fums can control the agency and expected
fmancial distress costs associated with long-term financing not only by hedging, but also by
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issuing convertible debt (CONV) or preferred stock (PS). Because CONV and PS are possible
substitutes for hedging, Nance et al. predict negative relations between derivatives use and these
debt instruments. In contrast to this prediction, we (indirectly) predict a positive relation between
derivatives use and both CONV and PS. We base our prediction on the Froot et al. argument that
firms that are more financially constrained are exposed to greater underinvestment costs. This
prediction assumes that preferred stock and convertible debt reflect additional leverage, which
constrains a firm's access to external funds.
Nance et al. also argue that fmns can reduce the expected financial distress and agency
costs associated with long-term debt by maintaining greater short-term liquidity. We use two
variables as proxies for a fum 's short-term liquidity: the quick ratio, which is cash and short-term
investments divided by current liabilities (QillCK_AV); and the dividend payout ratio (DIV_AV ).
The quick ratio, a variant of the current ratio, measures a firm's ability to repay short-term
operating liabilities with readily available cash. The numerator of the quick ratio differs from that
of the current ratio by including only cash and marketable securities, rather than all short-term
assets. Because converting certain short-term assets, such as inventories or accounts receivable,
to cash can create information costs similar to those related to debt fmancing, the quick ratio can
capture the concept of internal wealth used in Froot et al. better than the current ratio. The
greater a firm's quick ratio and the lower its dividend payout ratio, the lower its need to hedge to
reduce the expected financial distress and agency costs of straight debt. Froot et al. also predict a
negative association between liquidity and hedging.

This prediction results from interpreting

liquidity not as a substitute for long-term debt, but as a measure of the availability of internal
funds.

Equitylwlders: Smith and Stulz (1985) demonstrate that hedging increases the expected
value of an equityholder's ownership claim when a progressive statutory corporate tax schedule
creates concavities in a frrm's expected profit function. Tax preference items such as tax credits,
which are subtracted from pretax income, indirectly create convexity in the tax liability (concavity
in firm value), because the present value of unused preference items decreases as they are carried
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forward to future periods. Reducing variance through hedging increases the expected value of tax
benefits because the probability of using preference items increases with the level of a fum's
taxable income. We measure the availability of tax preference items using the book value of net
operating losscarryforwards outstanding scaled by total assets (NOL\
Two additional proxies for tax incentives were considered by Nance, Smith, and Smithson
(1993). However, these proxies are not used in this paper because our sample period follows the
Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986.

Their frrst proxy measures a firm's probability of facing

progressive tax rates. Because rate changes regulated by TRA induce volatility in the time series
of tax expense, the Nance et al. metric might ov erstate management's expectations of the firm 's
4

probability of operating in the progressive tax region.

Their second proxy measures the

availability of tax preference items by using available investment tax credits (ITCs).
generally repealed ITCs (Code Section 49).

TRA

Consequently, we use only net operating loss

carryforwards as a proxy for tax incentives.
DeMarzo and Duffie ( 1991) argue that equityholders can benefit from hedging when
managers have private information about an unobservable risk that affects the fum's payoffs. In
their model, hedging gives uninformed equityholders reduced noise in their information sets
concerning the variability of a firm's payoffs because hedging reduces their variance.
Equityholders support hedging because they can make better optimal p ortfolio optimization
decisions.

DeMarzo and Duffie's model suggests that equityholders of fums w ith greater

informational asymmetry will deriv e greater benefits if the firm hedges.
We use two proxy v ariables to measure information asymmetry : the percentage of
institutional ownership of the sample fum (IO), and the number of investment frrms with analysts
following the sample frrm (ANLST). We assume that a larger analyst following and a greater
number of institutional inv estors are positively related to the availability of information, and thus
negatively related to the probability of hedging.
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B. Variation and Exposure
Firms with greater variation in cash flows or accounting earnings resulting from exposure
to foreign exchange-rate risk have greater potential benefits of using currency derivatives. We
measure this variation related to operating activities using the absolute value of the ratio of pretax
foreign net income to total sales (FORINC).
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The higher a fmn's foreign pretax income, the

greater the benefits from hedging. Income represents the net of foreign-denominated revenues,
and also the direct and indirect expenses, which may be foreign-denominated, related to foreign
operations. To the extent that costs are a natural hedge of foreign revenues, net profit represents
the underlying exposure to foreign currency risk.

But because this measure can also include

allocated domestic expenses, we additionally measure exposure to foreign exchange-rate risk by
using the ratio of foreign sales to total sales (FORSALES) and the ratio of foreign assets to total
assets (FORASSETS)~
Foreign-denominated debt can also act as a natural hedge of foreign revenues, thereby
decreasing a fmn's foreign exchange-rate exposure. On the other hand, foreign debt can increase
a firm's exposure to foreign exchange-rate risk if debt-related cash outflows and net foreigndenominated cash inflows are negatively correlated.

Because this correlation cannot be

determined from publicly available data, we cannot predict the relation between foreign debt and
derivatives use. We measure the exposure of a firm's debt to foreign exchange-rate risk by the
dollar equivalent amount of foreign-denominated long- and short-term debt (LTFRDT and
STFRDT).

We also use an indicator variable equal to one (FORDEBT) if the fmn has

quantifiable foreign-denominated long- or short-term debt, or makes a qualitative, but not
quantitative, disclosure about the existence of foreign-denominated debt.
Finally, variation in a frrm's short-term cash flows is related to changes in exchange rates
when foreign competitors can affect market prices, and thus demand for domestic output. We
measure this competitive exposure by using the percentage of imports in a firm's four-digit SIC
industry relative to total industry output (HvlPORTS). As the percentage of imports increases,
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changes in the value of the dollar versus other currencies become a more significant factor in
demand for domestic output.

C. Costs

Costs also play a role in a fmn's decision to use currency derivatives and in its choice
among derivatives strategies.

We consider two major components of these costs: those

associated with initiating and maintaining a risk management program m general, and those
associated with choosing a particular currency derivative instrument.

If the costs are high

enough, a firm will not use any derivatives. If the costs are low enough, they can still affect a
firm's choice among instruments.
Costs associated with implementing and maintaining a risk management program,
including those related to the acquisition of expertise, exhibit economies of scale related to the
amount of risk managed.

Two variables previously introduced to measure variation, pretax

foreign income (FORIN C) and foreign-denominated debt (FORDEBT), are also proxies for
economies of scale.

Because these proxies are negatively correlated with the costs of

implementing a derivative strategy and positively related to the benefits, w e predict a positive
association with derivatives use for both of these v ariables.
Another measure of economies of scale is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm uses
other types of derivatives (OTHDERIV) in addition to currency-based derivatives. Firms that use
other types of derivatives can have greater expertise and lower transaction costs associated with
derivatives trading. Therefore, we predict a positive association between OTHDERIV and the
use of currency derivatives.
Finally, fmn size (SIZE) is a proxy for economies of scale in the costs of hedging. As
discussed in Nance et al., there are alternative arguments for either a positive or negative relation
between fmn size and hedging activity. For example, smaller fmns should hedge more, ceteris

p aribus, because of the inverse relation between firm size and bankruptcy costs (Warner, 1977).
We might also expect a negative relation between frrm size and the use of derivatives if smaller
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ftrms have greater information asymmetries. O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) document that analyst
following and institutional ownership, which proxy for information asymmetry, are positively and
negatively related to ftrm size, respectively, in a multivariate setting. Ultimately, the predicted
sign of the estimated coefficient on SIZE is ambiguous.
If a frrm chooses to implement a risk management program, it also must consider the costs
associated with particular instrument choices. These costs include liquidity costs, transactions
costs of customization, and basis risk. Liquidity and transaction costs are greater for customized
and long-term contracts, but customization reduces basis risk. We ignore costs associated with
counterparty default risk, because almost all of our sample frrms use ov er-the-counter currency
derivatives.
Operating exposures generally represent a series of transactions with a subsequent single
payment, for example, sales or payments on credit.

In contrast, debt exposures generally

represent a single or small number of transactions with multiple but certain subsequent payments.
Therefore, foreign-debt exposure over the life of the debt contract is known at the inception of
the contract. Thus, frrms can implement a long-term risk-management strategy with low basis risk
at the inception of the debt contract.

Operating exposure, however, needs to be managed

dynamically to minimiz e costs associated with basis risk.
Forward contracts provide a relatively low-cost method for matching the payoffs of
frequent and uncertain transactions. The downside to using forwards is the basis risk associated
with differences between characteristics of the underlying transaction and the forward contract,
such as the maturity or payoff date.

Basis risk for operating transactions is relatively small,

however, because each individual transaction is of a short-term nature.
Over-the-counter swap contracts are more cost-effective for the risks associated with
longer-term debt contracts because these instruments can be customized to reduce basis risk
associated with generic forward contracts. In addition, because there are ftxed costs associated
with each contract, the cost of customization is relatively lower for a single long-term contract
than for a portfolio of short-term contracts with comparable maturity .
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III. Sample Companies and Derivative Instrument Activity
We construct our sample of industrial firms from Fortune's 1991 list of the 500 U.S.
industrial corporations with the highest sales for fiscal year 1990. Of the Fortune 500 fmns, we
eliminate cooperatives (13), subsidiaries of foreign owned corporations (13), private companies
(44), firms acquired during fiscal year 1991 (8), fmns operating under Chapter 11 during the
sample period (8), and fmns not included on the Compustat tapes (3). Four hundred eleven firms
rem am.
We further restrict the sample to those fmns with foreign exchange-rate exposure at yearend 1990. By eliminating firms with no exposure, we are able to concentrate on the major crosssectional differences that affect the incentives for hedging.

Measuring foreign exchange-rate

exposure, however, is difficult. We consider that all of the following are indications of foreign
exchange-rate exposure: reporting pretax foreign income (311 fmns ), foreign sales (282 firms),
non-zero long- or short-term foreign-denominated debt ( 120 and 57 firms, respectively), or nonzero foreign tax expense (342 firms); discussing (qualitatively) foreign operations in the annual
report footnotes (67 firms); or belonging to a four-digit SIC industry in the upper quartile of the
411 sample firms with respect to IMPORTS (103).
Our fmal sample contains 3 72 firms that have at least one source of foreign exchange-rate
exposure. None of the 39 frrms eliminated by our restrictions use currency derivatives. We also
examine partitions of this sample based on exposures to various sources of exchange-rate risk.
The results are only reported in the cases where significant differences exist.
We obtain data about the use of currency swaps, forwards, futures, and options by reading
accounting footnotes to annual reports and/or 10-K filings for fiscal year-end 1991. We use a
dichotomous measure of derivatives use because the reported information about the magnitude of
off-balance sheet activities is either inconsistent or missing.

Although notional amounts are

available for some firms, our sample size would be greatly reduced if we were to restrict our
sample to only those frrms with a continuous measure of derivatives activity. More importantly,
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we do not use notional amounts as a measure of exposure because the annual report disclosures
are noisy, often because of aggregation and netting.

[Insert Table II here]

Table II presents a summary of currency derivatives use by the sample firms, partitioned
on the basis of firm size and industry. The frequency of currency derivatives use increases across
the last three size quartiles. It nearly doubles from the third to fourth quartiles (see Table II,
Panel A). Because we restrict our sample to firms with foreign exchange-rate exposure, the
reported frequencies are higher than those reported in surveys of random firms (Wharton/Chase
Survey, 1994). As Panel B shows, firms in the consumer goods and electronics industries are the
most frequent users of foreign currency derivatives. The differences in derivatives use across
industries may reflect industry-specific characteristics associated with either increased overseas
foreign exchange-rate exposure or incentives for optimal risk reduction. Because of the observed
differences across industries, we include industry indicator variables in our analysis.

IV. Determinants of Corporate Users of Currency Derivatives

A. Univariate Tests
Table III presents summary statistics for the proxy variables described in the previous
sections, and tests of differences between the means of these variables for users and non-users of
currency derivatives. User fnms are statistically different from non-user firms with respect to
variables that are proxies for investment growth opportunities.

User frrms have significantly

greater ratios of research and development expenditures to sales, and smaller book-to-market
ratios (BM), than do non-users of derivatives.

In addition, currency derivatives users' quick

ratios (QUICK_AV) are statistically lower than those of non-users. This suggests that these two
groups differ with respect to proxies for short-term liquidity. Currency derivatives users also
have larger managerial option holdings than do non-users.

Finally, non-users exhibit less
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informational asymmetry than do users, as measured by institutional ownership or analyst
following.

[Insert Table III here]

The univariate tests suggest that users of currency derivatives are not statistically different
from non-users with respect to managerial wealth, substitutes for hedging, or tax preference
items. The univariate results related to the proxies for financial distress are mixed. Although the
long-term debt ratios of users of currency derivatives are statistically lower than those of nonusers, the interest coverage ratios of the two groups are not statistically different.

When we

analyze firms that have foreign operations but no foreign denominated debt (results not
presented), users have larger managerial shareholdings. This result is consistent with the industryspecific hedging studies in which much of the cross-sectional variation in underlying exposure is
eliminated by construction (Schrand and

Una~

1996, and Tufano, 1996). However, as we note in

the next section, managerial wealth is not statistically significant in logit regressions for this
sample.
In addition to cross-sectional differences in hedging incentiv es, currency derivatives users
and non-users also differ on the costs of implementing a derivatives strategy. On average, user
firms are significantly larger than non-user firms, with mean (logged) capitalizations of $8.24
million and $7.13 million, respectively.

User rums also have greater exposure to foreign

exchange-rate risk, as measured by foreign pretax income, foreign sales, foreign-denominated
debt, and IMPORTS.

Finally, the ratio of foreign to total assets (FORASSETS) is not

significantly different across users and non-users. This observation is consistent with the results
of the Wharton/Chase survey (1995) of derivatives users in which only 4.7 percent of the
respondents indicate that their firms hedge balance sheet ratios. The remainder of the respondents
indicate that their fnms hedge cash flows or accounting earnings that are associated with foreign
income, sales, or debt.
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B. Logit Results
We estimate logit regresstons to distinguish among the possible explanations for
derivatives use.

Table IV presents the results of logit regressions of a dichotomous variable

representing deriv atives use on the explanatory variables and industry indicator v ariables. The
dependent v ariable is equal to one for currency derivatives users and zero for non-users. Because
multiple proxies are available to measure some frrm characteristics (such as the coverage and the
long-term debt ratios as measures of financial distress) we estimate separate logit regressions,
using all possible combinations of variables representing each predicted construct. The results are
qualitatively similar.

[Insert Table I V here]

Table IV reports marginal changes m the probability of using derivative instruments,
implied by the logit coefficient estimates, that result from a unit change in the explanatory
variables. These marginal sensitivities are labeled .t1Prob. In the discussion below, we focus on
these marginal effects.
We present the results for two sets of logit regressions. The first regression uses book-tomarket ratios (BM ) as proxies for growth opportunities. Of the 372 sample firms, there are 282
frrms with available data (full sample).

The second regression substitutes research and

development expenditures for BM . These data are available for 220 frrms (partial sample). For
the full sample, the estimated model predicts 75 percent of the observations correctly, with 29
percent and 21 percent of derivatives users and non-users, respectiv ely, misclassified. In the
sample that includes RD, 78 percent of the observations are predicted correctly, with 21 percent
and 24 percent of deriv atives users and non-users,

respective~is clas sified.

As Table IV reports, fmancing constraints provide incentives for hedging. Specifically,
higher quick ratios, which indicate more internally available funds, imply a significantly lower
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probability of using currency derivative instruments. This result is consistent with the Froot et al.
prediction that hedging activity is useful to secure the availability of internal funds.

It also

supports the Nance et al. prediction that using substitutes for straight debt can reduce a ftnn's
relative need to hedge because the agency costs of straight debt are lower.
The results also suggest that potential underinvestment costs provide incentives for
hedging. A one percent increase in the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales yields a statistically
significant increase of 6.98 percent in the probability that a fmn uses currency derivatives. One
possible explanation for the significance ofRD is given by Lewent and Kearney (1990), who note
that long-term R&D projects force fmns to seek overseas revenues because domestic R&D
fmancing can be costly. Because R&D is usually centralized, the firm faces a mismatch between
domestic costs and foreign revenues. According to Lewent and Kearney, it is this mismatch that
motivates the hedging activity to insure that internal funds are available for continued investment.
Additionally, the interaction of the inverse of BM and a firm's long-term debt ratio
(DE_AV* 1/BM) is statistically significant and positive. This result suggests that the incentive to
use derivatives to reduce underinvestment costs is greater when a fum ' s external financial
flexibility is lower.
The results related to underinvestment costs depend to some extent on the source of
foreign exchange-rate risk.

In particular, for firms with foreign operations and foreign-

denominated debt (naturally-hedged fmns), R&D expenses and short-term liquidity are not
significant determinants of currency derivatives use (logit results are not presented). In contrast,
R&D expenses and short-term liquidity are still significant in logit regressions for fmns with only
foreign operations but no foreign-denominated debt.

These results suggest that foreign-

denominated debt and currency derivatives may act as substitutes for hedging foreign operatibns.
Exposure to foreign exchange-rate risk is also an important factor in the decision to use
derivatives. As predicted in Section II, derivatives use is positively associated with a fmn 's level
of foreign pretax income, its use of foreign-denominated debt, and the percentage of imports
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relativ e to total industry sales. These results are significant even after we control for fmn size and
other potential measures oftnultinationality.
Finally, the costs associated with implementing a derivatives strategy also play a role in a
firm's decision to use currency derivatives. Assuming that the use of other types of derivatives
(OTHDERIV) and (the log of) firm size (SIZE) are proxies for economies of scale, the observed
positive coefficients suggest the presence of cost-driv en motives for hedging.
The logit results do not support DeMarzo and Duffie's (1991) information asymmetry
explanation for hedging, as evidenced by the positive coefficient on the standardized number of
analyst fmns. 10 An explanation consistent with this result is that managers of fmns with a larger
analyst following could face more pressure on their quarterly performance, and thus prefer fewer
earnings surprises. If this is true, we would expect these fmns to hedge more than fmns with
lower analyst following. But the causality could go the other way. Analysts could choose to
follow firms with more stable cash flows and fewer earnings surpriJes.

[Insert Table V here]

In addition, the results do not support Smith and Stulz' ( 1985) tax or managerial
contracting cost explanations for corporate hedging. The coefficient estimates of our proxies for
managerial contracting costs in the logit regressions (MGRWLTH and standardized OPTS), are
not statistically significant.

C Robustness
Our logit tests can be criticized because some of the independent variables that measure
potential incentives for derivatives use are, themselv es, choice variables. The long-term debt ratio
and the management compensation variables create the most concern because choices about
capital structure and managerial compensation can be made simultaneously with the decision to
use derivative instruments. 12 Moreover, the endogeneity of the managerial compensation choice
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13

and the derivatives decision can depend on the firm's level of financial distress.

Although we

recognize that it is almost impossible to eliminate these endogeneity issues, we have investigated
several alternative variable specifications to mitigate this problem, and have provided robustness
checks of our empirical results
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.

In all the cases discussed below, our conclusions are unaffected

by the alternative specifications and procedures.
To control for possible endogeneity in any of our independent v ariables, we measure all of
them as of fiscal year-end 1990 but measure the choice of derivatives use as of fiscal year-end
1991. In the results presented in Table IV, the stock variables, such as the book-to-market and
long-term debt ratios, are measured as of fiscal year-end 1990.

The flow variables, such as

research and dev elopment expenditures and foreign income, are measured contemporaneously
with the sample year.

Measuring all variables as of fiscal year-end 1990 does not affect the

results. This robustness check, however, is not completely satisfactory if serial dependence exists
in these variables .
To further control for the simultaneity ofthe capital structure and currency derivatives use
decisions, we estimate the determinants of these decisions simultaneously with a two-stage
estimation technique (M addala, 1983). There is no theoretical model explaining a fmn's joint
choice of its capital structure and currency derivatives use. Therefore, we specify the model of
the capital structure decision following Titman and Wessels (1988) and Opler and Titman
(1996). 15 Because the capital structure decision equation includes RD, the model of the currency
derivativ es use decision follows the specification shown in Table IV that includes RD.

The

structural equations are:

Capital structure decision :
DE_ A V =

o0 + o CURDERIV * +o RD + o L OG ( SAL ES ) + o SGA + o TANGS
1

2

78

+

L

1 =1

o1 IND 1

3

4

5

( 1)
+ t:
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Currency derivatives use decision:
CURDERIV = ~NOL + ~ DE _A V *+ll:JRD + ?..4 RD* (DE _AV *)+ ~ Q UICK
+ -\,ANLST- STAND + ~ SIZE + AsFORINC+

~FORDEBT

(2)

7

+ ~0 IMPORTS + ~ 1 OTHDERIV + ~ ?..1 INDCLASS 1 + w
1=1

In equation (1), CURDERIV * is the predicted value of currency derivatives use obtained

from the first-stage estimation of the currency derivativ es use decision equation; LOG( SALES) is
the natural logarithm of sales during the sample

year~

SGA is the ratio of selling, general and

administrative expenses to sales; TANGS is the three-y ear average of the ratio of tangible assets
(total assets less intangible assets from Compustat) to total assets; and IND 1 through IND77 are
indicator variables representing 4-digit SIC classifications.

In equation (2), DE_AV* is the

predicted v alue of the long-term debt ratio obtained from the first-stage estimation of the capital
structure decision equation, and IND CL ASS represents the seven industry classifications that
were used in the Table IV regresswns.

As in the logit regressions, OPTS and ANLST are

standardized
The parameter estimates and their significance levels for the capital structure decision
equation are similar to those presented in Opler and Titman (1996).

The results of these

regressions (not reported) show that the coefficient estimate on the predicted probability of using
currency derivativ es is not statistically different from zero. This result suggests that there is no
clear association between the decision to use currency derivatives and capital structure choice.
More importantly, the predicted long-term debt ratio is not a statistically significant determinant
of the decision to use currency deriv atives.

However, the interaction v ariable of RD and

DE_A V* is statistically significant, similar to the results presented in Table IV. Additionally, the
coefficient estimates for the other explanatory variables in equation (2) are similar to those
reported in Table IV . The parameter estimates for the capital structure decision equation are
robust to exclusion of the industry indicator variables.
In addition to this simultaneous equations approach, we also estimate several variants of
the Table IV logit regressions to address the problem of endogeneity of a firm 's capital structure,
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represented by the long-term debt ratio. First, we reestimate the logit regressions, excluding the
long-term debt ratio but including the interaction variable that measures the combination of both
financial distress and growth opportunities. The results for this logit specification are virtually
unchanged from those presented in Table IV. Therefore, the long-term debt ratio is not driving
the results.
Second, we use Standard & Poor's credit ratings as a proxy for fmancial distress instead of
firms' long-term debt ratios.

An advantage of doing this is that credit ratings are less of a

managerial choice variable than capital structure because they are assigned by a third party. A
disadvantage of using credit ratings is that they are ordinal measures, and therefore less
informative than a continuous variable. S&P credit ratings are obtained from Compustat and the

S&P B ond Guides, and are assigned values from three to 22 for AAA+ to D-rated firms,
respectively. Ratings are available for 258 of the 372 sample firms.

The ratings series has a

correlation of 57.7 percent with long-term debt ratios and -24.7 percent with interest coverage
ratios. We reestimate the Table IV logit regressions, substituting for the long-term debt ratio
three indicator variables that represent fnms rated AA- or better (56 firms), A- to A+ (83 fnms),
and BBB- to BBB+ (72 fnms). Firms below investment grade (47 fnms) serve as the control
group. None of the coefficients on these indicator variables are significant. The estimates of the
other coefficients in the regressions do not change for either the full or partial sample.
Next, we include an industry-adjusted long-term debt ratio as a proxy for financial distress
instead of the actual long-term debt ratio.

We calculate the industry-adjusted ratio as the

difference between the frrm's long-term debt ratio and the median long-term debt ratio for the
fum's four-digit SIC industry. By doing this, we assume that the industry median is the frrm's
target long-term debt ratio, and that any excess or shortfall relative to this median represents a
measure of fmancial distress.

As with the use of S&P credit ratings, our logit results are

unchanged by this substitution, and the coefficient estimate for the industry-adjusted variable is
insignificant.
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To control for the potential endogeneity of the managerial compensation structure, we
industry-adjust the managerial wealth and managerial option ownership variables. Just as we
industry-adjusted the long-term debt ratio, we calculate the difference between the log of
managerial wealth and the median for the industry, and the log of the market value of shares
obtainable with options and its industry median. We define the industries for these variables based
on the eight industry groupings presented in Table II, which are derived from the Fortune industry
codes.

Using the industry-adjusted compensation variables instead of MGRWLTH and

standardized OPTS in the regressions shown in Table IV does not change the results for the
existing variables.

The coefficients are insignificant for both of these industry-adjusted

compensation variables.
Finally, we examine the incremental impact of financial distress on derivatives choice for
firms whose managers have high levels of wealth. To do this, we interact the long-term debt ratio
with an indicator variable equal to one for those firms with managerial wealth in the upper quartile
of the sample. We include this interaction variable as well as the long-term debt ratio in the logit
regressions presented in Table IV. The marginal probability of the interaction variable measures
whether, conditional on the fum's level of fmancial distress, managerial wealth affects the
derivativ es decision. We separately measure a similar interaction variable for option ownership.
The coefficient estimates for these interaction variables are insignificant for both samples, and
their inclusion in the models does not change the existing results.

D. Hedging versus Speculating
The consistency of our results with models of optimal hedging behavior suggests that
firms, on average, are not speculating with currency derivatives.

If the motives for optimal

hedging and speculation are correlated, however, our results might not distinguish between these
two activities. In this section, we consider fums' motives for speculation and their implications
for our results.

24
Equityholders are likely to support the use of currency derivatives for speculation if
speculation is a profit-making activity, if equity shares are viewed as options on the value of a
levered fum, or if managers of low-output fums want to create noise to mimic high-output fums
(Ljungqvist, 1994). For speculation to be a profit-making activity in rational markets, either a
firm must have an information advantage related to the prices of the instruments underlying the
derivatives, or it must have economies of scale in transactions costs allowing for profitable
arbitrage opportunities.

This suggests that firm size (SIZE) and the use of other derivativ es

(OTHDERIV) are possible determinants of the use of currency derivatives for speculation.

If equityholders view their shares as options on the value of a levered fum, we would
expect them to support any speculation that increases firm volatility when the fum is close to (or
in) fmancial distress so that the option is near-the-money (or out-of-the-money). Managerial
option holdings similarly provide incentives for speculation. Therefore, results that are related to
the association between currency derivatives use and variables that measure fmancial distress will
also measure the potential motiv es oiquityholders to speculate.
Finally, in a signaling framework, Ljungqvist (1994) argues that managers of low-output
firms will speculate to create noise so that their output mimics that of high-output fums. He
assumes that speculation is an unobservable fair gamble with expected profits equal to zero
(including no transactions costs), and that there is no penalty for incurring a negative outcome
from the speculative activity. If we assume that low expected output implies fmancial distress,
then the model suggests that fums near bankruptcy hav e greater incentives to speculate and delay
the resolution of uncertainty.

This result, however, relies heavily on the assumption that

speculation is unobservable. This assumption is unnatural given increased monitoring by outside
debtholders as firms near bankruptcy.
Overall, the univariate and logit results of the previous sections do not support speculative
motives for derivatives use. Firm size and the use of other derivatives are positively related to the
likelihood of using currency derivatives. However, our measures for variation in cash flow or
accounting earnings that result from exchange-rate exposure are also significant. Additionally,
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our proxies for fmancial distress are not significantly related to the likelihood of using currency
derivativ es. Finally, of the 39 fnms that we dropped from our sample because they had no ex ante
foreign exchange-rate risk exposure, none disclosed using currency derivatives. Because the use
of currency derivatives by these firms could have suggested speculation, this observation is further
ev idence against widespread speculation in currency derivatives by our sample firms.

V. The Choice among T ypes of Currency Derivatives
In this section, we examine how fums ' choices among types of derivatives are associated

with various sources of exposure to exchange-rate risk. As previously discussed in Section II.C,
this link derives from differences in the costs of using particular instruments to manage specific
sources of foreign exchange-rate exposure. For example, fums might choose to use long-term
customized currency swaps to manage foreign exchange-rate exposures which extend over
multiple periods but are predetermined (e.g. foreign-denominated debt payments). This derivative
strategy might be the lower cost alternative because it results in a lower level of basis risk than the
choice of using a series of short-term forward contracts. In contrast, short-term forwards might
be the lower cost alternative for frequent short-term transactions which are characterized by
uncertainty about their timing and quantities (e.g. foreign-denominated sales on account).
In our analysis, we partition the sample based on firms ' derivative instrument choices. For

each choice we examine fums ' sources of foreign exchange-rate exposure. We divide the sample
into three groups. The first group includes all firms that do not use currency derivatives. The
second group includes all fums that use either currency swaps only or currency swaps in
combination with other currency derivativ es. The third group includes all fums that use only
foreign exchange forwards or forwards in combination with futures contracts or options. These
groups are designed to distinguish among fums based on the costs associated with these three
derivativ es choices. This division also allows a workable number of observations for the most
important kinds of instrument choices available to currency derivatives users.
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[Insert Table VI here]

Table VI shows the frequency of use of currency derivative instruments by type.

We

include this table as a benclunark for analyzing derivative instrument choices in a multivariate
setting.

As previously reported, less than half of the sample fums report using currency

derivatives. Of those fums that do disclose using currency derivatives, the most frequently used
instruments are forwards only or forwards in combination with futures or options. As Panel A
reports, 29.3 percent of the frrms report using forwards and forward combinations, while only
12.1 percent report using currency swaps either alone or in combination with other currency
deriv atives.
The remammg results in Table VI document a positive relation between specific
derivativ es strategies and a fum 's underlying foreign exchange exposure.

These results offer

further support that our sample fums use derivatives to hedge rather than to speculate. Panel B
presents the means of various measures of exposure to foreign exchange-rate risk by the type of
currency derivatives used. The estimates indicate that both swaps users and forwards users have
significantly higher foreign income and sales than fums that do not use currency derivative
instruments.

However, this measure of foreign exchange-rate exposure is not significantly

different across firms that use swaps or forwards.
The other sources of exposure are significantly associated with only one type of
derivatives use but not with both. For example, frrms that use swaps only or swap combinations
have statistically higher levels of long-term foreign-denominated debt than firms that use no
currency derivatives. Forwards users, however, do not have statistically higher levels of foreigndenominated debt than non-users of currency derivatives. In addition, fums that use forwards
only or forwards in combination with futures and options have higher foreign exchange-rate
ex posure from import competition than firms that do not use currency derivatives.
We use a multinomial logit (MNL) model to examine fums' choices among the three
currency derivative categories (presented in Table VI) in a multivariate setting. The results are
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presented in Table VII. The model is normalized with respect to the choice of using no currency
derivative instruments. The independent variables are identical to those presented in Table IV for
the partial sample, except that we use continuous measures of long- and short-term foreigndenominated debt and do not include industry dummies due to the limited number of observations
for the choices.
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We include these continuous debt measures because we are focusing on the

costs associated with various derivative strategies relative to a firm's underlying foreign
ex change-rate exposure.
[Insert Table VII here]

Table VII reports the marginal probabilities of choosing a particular derivative instrument
combination implied by the multinomial logit coefficient estimates (also reported in Table VII).
These marg inal sensitiv ities are labeledProb.
The MNL results in Table VII provide mixed ev idence on whether the source of
underlying exposure to foreign exchange-rate risk affects the choice among types of currency
derivativ es.

Firms with higher levels of operating and competitive exposure, as measured by

pretax foreign income (FORINC) and the percentage of imports relative to total industry sales
(IMPORTS), are more likely to choose both classes of currency derivatives.

As Table VII

reports, the marginal probabilities associated with FORINC and HvfPORTS for using forward
combinations, however, are about three times those for swap combinations (significantly different
at the 2 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively). This suggests that firms with operating or
competitive foreign exchange-rate exposure are more likely to use either forwards only, or
forwards in combination with futures or options, than swaps.
In contrast, foreign exchange-rate exposure associated with foreign-denominated debt is
not a significant determinant of a fum ' s choice among types of currency derivatives. As Table
VII reports, neither long- nor short-term foreign-denominated debt are statistically significant
determinants of either currency derivatives choice. Although not reported, we also obtain similar
results if we substitute the indicator variable used in Table IV, which is equal to unity if a fum
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discloses having any foreign-denominated debt and zero otherwise, instead of the continuous debt
variables.
The relation between the ratio of R&D expenses to sales is significant only for users of
forwards only and forwards combinations. The point estimate of the marginal probability for the
choice of forwards only and forwards combinations (Choice 2) is positive and significant, while it
is not reliably different from zero for the choice of swaps and swap combinations (Choice 1). If
foreign sales are generally hedged with short-term currency derivatives such as forward contracts,
then the greater significance of R&D related to forwards use is consistent with the argument
presented in Section IV. As stated previously, a frrm might be exposed to foreign exchange-rate
risk because of the mismatch between centralized R&D costs and foreign revenues (Lewent and
Kearney, 1990).

Because foreign revenues represent frequent and uncertain transactions,

currency forwards are a more cost-effective alternative for dynamically hedging these revenues
than currency swaps.
The remaining results are generally consistent with those of the logit regressions.

As

Table VII reports, a frrm's quick ratio, a measure of a frrm 's short-term liquidity, is a significant
and negative determinant of both choices of currency derivatives. Larger firms and frrms that use
other derivatives are also more likely to use both classes of currency derivatives. However, the
association between SIZE and forwards use is significantly lower than that between SIZE and
swaps use at the 3 percent level. As in Section IV, the positive marginal probabilities suggest that
economies of scale in implementing and maintaining a derivatives strategy are important
determinants of currency derivatives use.
The MNL regressions offer conflicting evidence on the importance of managerial
incentives for derivatives use. As Table VII reports, the coefficient estimate on managerial wealth
is not statistically different from zero for forwards use (Choice 2). However, managerial wealth is
a negative and marginally significant determinant of swaps use (Choice 1). These results are
contrary to the prediction of Smith andHulz ( 1985).
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The coefficient estimate of managerial option ownership, while insignificant for Choice 1,
is positive and significant for Choice 2. This indicates that fnms with higher option ownership are
more likely to use forwards only or forwards combinations than swaps. This positive relation
does not support Smith and Stulz' (1985) managerial contracting cost explanation for hedging,
which predicts a negative relation between managerial option holdings and derivatives use if
derivatives are used for hedging.

One possible explanation for this positive relation is the

observed positive association between the use of options in managerial compensation contracts
and a fum 's involvement in research and development activities (Clinch, 1991 ). In the case of
fnms with long-term investment projects like R&D, managerial options align the incentives of
risk-averse mangers with those of shareholders. High R&D firms are the same fnms for which
forwards are the low cost alternative for hedging the mismatch between foreign revenues and
R&D costs (Lewent and Kearney, 1990).
Finally, standardized analyst following is significantly and positively associated with the
use of forwards only, or forwards in combination with futures or options.

As with the logit

results, this positive association is not consistent with the DeMarzo and Duffie (1991) information
argument for optimal hedging.

VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the determinants of corporate use of currency derivatives from

the perspectives of managers, debtholders, and equityholders.

The results of univariate and

multivariate tests ofthe differences between currency derivatives users and non-users indicate that
firms with a combination of high growth opportunities but low accessibility to internal and
external fmancing are most likely to use currency derivatives. This result is consistent with the
hypothesis that hedging can reduce underinvestment costs associated with investment
opportunities in the presence of fmancial constraints. Currency derivatives user fums, which are
generally larger than non-users, are further characterized by greater analyst following and
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institutional ownership, and greater managerial option holdings. These two groups of fums are
similar in their tax positions and in managerial share ownership.
We also consider how a fum's exposure to foreign exchange-rate risk affects the potential
benefits of using currency derivatives and the costs of implementing a specific derivatives
strategy. We find that firm characteristics related to these costs and benefits are related to the
general decision to use currency derivatives and the specific choice among various types of
currency instruments. We take these results to indicate that our sample fums are hedging, and not
speculating, on average.
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Appendix
This appendix provides a summary of all explanatory v ariables used in our analysis and a detailed
description of the method of calculation. The explanatory variables are generally constructed as
follows : Flow variables are measured during the year of derivativ es use (1991), and stock
variables are measured at the beginning of the year (ftscal year end 1990).

Implicit in this

construction are two assumptions: First, decisions to use derivatives (measured at ftscal year end
1991) are based on information available to the ftrm during 1991; second, actual flows in 1991 are
the best proxy for management's expectations of 1991. Flow variables for 1990, however, may be
a better proxy for management's expectations depending on the timing of the flow, the timing of
the decision to use derivatives, and the degree to which management uses past performance to
estimate future flows.

Variable Name

Variable Description

ANLST

The number of analyst ftrms covering a company as of September/October 199 0,
according to Nelson 's Directory ofInvestment Research. Alternatively, ANLST
is measured as the number of analysts, rather than firms, following each sample
ftrm. The results are qualitatively similar using both specifications of ANL ST, so
we present only those based on the number offtrms .

BM

Ratio of book to market value of the firm. Book value of common shareholders'
equity as of the end of ftscal year 1990 is total assets less total liabilities less
outstanding preferred stock (Compustat data items 6, 181, and 130,
respectively). Market value is closing share price times common shares
outstanding at year-end 1990 Compustat data items 199 and 25, respectively).

CONV

Ratio of book value of total convertible debt as of ftscal year-end 1990
(Compustat data item 79) to SIZE.

cova

Interest coverage ratio. Ratio of pretax income for 1991 (Compustat data item
170) plus interest expense for 1991 (Compustat data item 15) to interest expense
plus capitalized interest (::ompustat data item 239) for 1991.

DEa

Long-term debt ratio. Ratio of book value of long-term debt as of the end of
fiscal year 1990 (::ompustat data items 34 plus 9) to SIZE.

35
DIVa

Variable Name

Dividend yield. Ratio of cash dividend per share in 1991 (Compustat data item
26) to closing price per share as of fiscal year-end 1990 (Compustat data item
199).

Variable Description

FORASSETS

Ratio of identifiable foreign assets at year-end 1990 (annual report) to total
assets.

FORDEBT

An indicator variable equal to one if the firm has either non-zero L TFRDT or

STFRDT or qualitatively discusses the existence of foreign-denominated debt in
its fiscal year-end 1990 annual report.
FORINC

Ratio of pretax income from the firm's foreign operations (Compustat data item
273) to sales (Compustat data item 12).

FORSALES

Ratio of foreign sales plus export sales for the year ended 1991 (annual report)
to sales (Compustat data item 12).

Hv1PORTS

The percentage of imports to total production (domestic production plus
imports) as of December 31, 1991. These data are reported by the Department
of Commerce for 4-digit SIC codes and matched to the sample based on
Compustat dnums. Where 4-digit dnums are not available, we obtain 4-digit
industry classifications from the 1991 annual report.

IO

The percentage of the finn's common shares outstanding held by institutional
owners at fiscal year-end 1990 as reported by Nelson's Directory of Investment
Research. Institutional investors include banks, brokerage firms, investment
managers, insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension funds. Similar results
related to institutional ownership are obtained using figures reported by Business
Week and O 'Neil Database.

LTFRDT

The long-term and current portion of debt issued with an original maturity
greater than one year, denominated in a currency other than US dollars (annual
report) at year-end 1990.

MGRWLTH

Market value of common shares beneficially owned (excluding shares that can be
obtained within 60 days through the exercise of options) by officers and directors
as a group as of fiscal year-end 1990 reporting date (Compact Disclosure, proxy
statements, and 10-K filings).

NOL

The portion of prior and current year net operating losses applied as a reduction
of taxable income in 1990 (Compustat data item 52) scaled by total assets
(Compustat data item 6). The book value of NOL is only reported on Compustat
if it appears in the firm's tax footnote. When net operating loss carryforwards
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are missing, we examine the ftnn's annual reports and 10-Ks to determine the
book value of NOL if available, or the tax value of net operating loss
carryforw ards if the book value is unavailable.
OPTS

The log of the market value of shares that can be obtained by exercise of options .
The options areexercisable within 60 days of the reporting date for common
shares beneficially owned by offices and directors as a group (Compact
Disclosure, proxy statements, and 10-K filings).

OTHDERIV

An indicator variable equal to one if the fmn discloses using either interest-ratebased or commodity-based derivative instruments; equal to zero otherwise.

Variable Name

Variable Description

PPE

Intensity of capital investment. Ratio of property, plant, and equipment at yearend 1990 (Compustat data item 187) to SIZE.

PS

Ratio of book value of total preferred stock as of the end of fiscal year 1990
(Compustat data item 130) to SIZE.

QUICKa

Quick ratio. Ratio of cash and short-term investments as of ftscal year-end 1990
(Compustat data item 1) to current liabilities as of fiscal year-end 1990
(Compustat data items 34, 70, 71, and 72).

RD

Ratio of R&D expenses during 1991 (Compustat data item 46) to sales
(Compustat data item 12).

SIZE

Market value of the ftrm at fiscal year-end 1990. Natural logarithm of the sum
of the market value of equity (Compustat data item 199 times Compustat data
item 25), book value of long-term debt (Compustat data items 9 and 34), and
book v alue of preferred stock (:ompus tat data item 130).

STFRDT

Debt issued with an original maturity less than one year denominated m a
currency other than U .S. dollars (annual report) at year-end 1990.

acov _AV, DE_AV, DIV_AV, and QUICK_AV are computed as three-year averages of COV,
DE, DIV, and QUICK, respectively.
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Table I
Predicted Sign s of C oefficient Estima t es
Predicted signs of coefficient estimates for variables used as proxies for incentives to use foreign currency
derivatives based on the testable implications of Smith and Stulz (1 985, S&S), Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993,
F SS) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1991, D&D). " D" refers to a direct prediction of a model; "I" refers to an indirect
prediction. "NA" indicates that the independent v ariable is not applicable to a particular m odel. "?" indicates that
the predicted sign is indeterminate. Variable names appear in the second column . Predicted signs appear in the
thi r d th rougJh fi1 fth co 1umns.
Prediction
S&S (1985)

FSS (1 993)

D&D (1 991)

MG RWLTH

+, D

NA

NA

OPTS

-, D

NA

NA

Interest cov erage ratio

CO V A V

-, D

-, D

NA

Long-term debt ratio

DE A V

+, D

+, D

NA

R& D expen ses/sale s

RD

+, I

+,D

+,I

PPE

+, I

+, D

+, I

BM

-, I

-, D

-, I

CONV

-, I

+,I

NA

PS

-, I

+, I

NA

QUICK_A V

-, I

-, D

NA

DIV A V

+, I

+, I

NA

NO L

+, D

-, I

NA

IO

NA

NA

-, D

ANLST

NA

NA

-, D

SIZE

?

?

-, I

Independent Variables

Variable Name

M anagers

Managerial wealth
Managerial option ownership
Bon dholders

Plant, property, and equipment
investment expenditures/S IZE
Book -to-market ratio
S ubs titu tes f or off-balan ce sh eet assets

Convertible debt / SIZE
Preferred stock/SIZE
Quick ratio
Dividend yield
E qu ity h olders

T ax-loss carryforwards/total assets
Instituti onal ownership
Number of analyst firms
Firm S ize
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T a ble II
F r equ ency of U se o f Derivative In strument s by Size an d Indu str y
Frequency of use o f derivative instruments by 372 large U. S. firms for fiscal year-end 1991 th at have foreign
exchange rate exposure as of fiscal y ear-end 1990. C ompanies are among the 500 larg est firms (by sales) in the
F ortune 500 . A firm has foreign exchange rate exp osure if it has n on-zero foreign pretax income, positiv e foreign
sales or debt, or is in the upper quartile of the sample firms on the basis o f imp orts as a percentage of total indu stry
sales. C urrency D erivatives include curren cy sw aps and foreign exchange forwards, futures and options. Any
D eri vatives in clude interest rate, commodity, and currency derivatives. All data on derivatives u se are from annual
reports and 10-K disclosures. The 1st quartile for firm size inclu des the smallest firms based on 1990 s ales; the
4th quartile includes the larg est firms.

All Firms

N

Currency
Derivatives

Any
Derivatives

372

41. 4%

59. 1%

93
93
93
93

75.3
38.7
34.4
17.2

90.3
64.5
48.4
33.3

47

66. 0%

6
22
14
5

83.3
59. 1
85.7
20.0

Panel A : By firm size (by 1990 sales}

4th quartile
3rd quartile
2nd quartile
1st quartile
Panel B: By Fortune's industry grouping
Consumer Goods

Bevera_ges
Food
Phannaceuticals
Tobacco
Electronics

Computers office equipment
Electronics, electrical equipment
Scientific, photographic, and control equipmen
Energy

Mining, crude oil production
Petroleum refinin_g
Metals

Jewelry, silverware
Metal products
Metals
N on-durab le consumer p roducts

Apparel
Furniture
Soaps cosmetics
Textiles
Toys sporting goods
Pap er

Forest and paper products
Publishin_g, printin_g
Production materials

Building materials glass
Ch emicals
Rubber and plastic products
T ransportation

Aerospace
Industrial and fann equipment
Motor vehicles and parts

78.7%

100.0
81.8
85.7
20.0

71

56.3%

63. 4%

18
35
18

83.3
42.9
55.6

88.9
48.6
66.7

32

34.4%

68.8%

12
20

8.3
50.0

58.3
75.0

32

21.9%

50. 0%

1
19
12

0.0
21.1
25.0

0.0
47.4
58.3

35

28.6%

11

5
11
6
2

27.3
0.0
36.4
16.7
100.0

42.8%

36.4
20.0
36.4
16.7
100.0

41

17.1%

39. 0%

27
14

18.5
14.3

44.4
28.6

50

44.0%

7
33
10

57.1
42.4
40.0

64

40.6%

59.4%

16
32

12.5
53.1
38.5

43.8
65.6
53.8

13

62.0%

100.0
57.6
50.0

39
Transportation equipment

3

66 .7

100.0
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Table III
Summ ary of Financial Characteristics of Currency Derivative Users and No:hlser s
Selected summary statistics for managerial and financial characteristics for firms that disclose the use of currency derivative
instruments (currency derivative users), and firms that do not (currency derivative non-users) for 372 largeU.S. firms with
foreign exchang e rate exposure. Companies are among the 500 largest firms (by sales) in theFortune 500. A firm has foreign
exchange rate exposure if it has non-zero foreign pretax income, positive foreign sales or debt, or is in the upper quartile of the
sample firms on the basis of imports as a percentage of total industry sales. Panel A reports summary statistics for proxies
related to incentives for hedging. Panel B reports summary statistics for proxies forforeign exchange exposure . All data are
measured as of fiscal year-ends . In the cases of missing data, the number of observations are given in parentheses. t-statistics
are given for tests o f the equality of m eans between currency derivative users and non-users. p-values are in parentheses.

Currency Deriv ative Users
(N = 154)
Variable

M ean

Median

Std. Dev.

M anagerial wealth
$8.23
(log $MM)
I(N = 141)
M anagerial option
7.45
ownership
(N = 131)
(log $MM)
Interest coverage rati
7.96
(N = 152)
Long-term debt ratio
0.28

$8.02

$1.64

7. 60

1.47

4.43

17.00

0.22

0.20

R&D expenses/sales

Currency Derivative Non
Users
(N = 2 18)
Mean Median Std.
Dev .

t~tatistic

a
(pvalue)

IPanel A : Incentives for hedging
$7.93
I(N = 203
6.46
(N = 169

$7.86

$ 1.79

6.50

1.37

3.82

41.78

0.31

0.20

0.02

0.02

0.34

0.28

0.05
(N = 136)
0.35

0.03

0.04

0.29

0.23

10.56
(N = 2 13
0.31
I(N = 2 14
0.02
(N = 133
0.41

0.52

0.51

0.53

0.70

0.61

0.56

Convertible debt!SIZ ~ 0.01
I(N = 150)
Preferred stock/SIZE
0.01

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.06

0.00

0.03

0.02
ICN = 2 16
0.01

0.00

0.04

Quick ratio

0.25
I(N = 153)
0.03

0.15

0.29

0.35

0.19

0.79

0.03

0.09

0.03

0.08

0.02
(N = 153)

0.00

0.08

0.04
ICN = 2 14
0.02
(N = 213

0.00

0.07

55.46
(N = 152)

58.3

14.70

48.59
(N = 205

52

16.67

Plant, property, and
equipment investmen
expenditures/SIZE
Book-to-market ratio

Dividend yield
Tax-loss
carryforwards I
total assets
Institutional
ownership

-1.60
(0.11)
-5.97
(0.00)
0.819
(0.41)
1.71
(0.09)
-5.58
(0.00)
2.24
(0.03)
3.20
(0.00)
0.98
(0.33)
1.29
(0.20)
1.73
(0.08)
0.28
(0.78)
-0.26
(0.80)
-4.05
(0.00)
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Number of analyst
26.16
firm s
Firm SIZE
$8.24
(log $MM)
IPanel B: Foreign exchange exp osure
Pretax foreign incom 0.033
I
total sales ICN = 149)
Foreign & export
0.389
sales I
(N = 141)
total sales
Identifiable foreign
0.346
assets I
total asseh (N = 138)
Foreign long-term
0.023
debt /
total asset! I(N = 153)
Foreign short-term
0.006
debt /
total asset I(N = 153)
Percentage of import 16.35%
in 4-digit SIC industr f,r

25

13.14

$8.26

$1.41

0.027

0.035

0.376

0.195

0.316

0.205

0.001
0
12%

15.43
(N = 211
$7.13
ICN = 217

14

9.37

$7.13

$ 1.01

0.018
ICN = 162
0.282
(N = 141

0.008

0.039

0.228

0.241

0.350
(N = 116
0.045
0.005
ICN = 216
0.018
0.003
ICN = 216
14.37% 12.03%

0.240

0.313

0
0
10%

-8.65
(0.00)
-8.33
(0.00)
-3.70
(0.00)
-4.10
(0.00)

0.12
(0.91)
0.014 -4.81
(0.00)
0.013 -1.85
(0.07)
11.05% -3.13
(0.00)

at-tests assume equal v ariances unless the null hypothesis of equal variances is rejected at a 10% significance level.
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Table I V
Logit Regression Estimates of the Lik elihood ofUsing C urrency Derivatives
Logit regression estimates of the relation between the likelihood that a firm uses currency derivatives and proxies for incentives
to use derivatives, proxies for foreign exchange exposure, and Fortune industry indicator variables for large U.S . fiilTls that
have foreign exchange rate exposure as of fiscal year-end 1990. Companies are among the 500 largest firms (by sales) in the
Fortune 500. A firm has foreign exchange rate exposure if it has non-zero foreign pretax income, positive foreign sales or debt,
or is in the upper quartile of the s ample firms on the basis of imports as a percentage of total industry sales. The second
through fourth columns present the signs of the coefficient estimates based on the testable implications of Smith andStulz
(1985, S&S), Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993, FSS), and DeMarzo and Duffie (1 991, D&D). The full sample of 282 firms
does n ot us e the ratio of research and developmentexpenses to sales (R&D) and contains firm s for which all data is available.
The partial sample of 220 firms contains firms with R&D data. iJ.Prob. measures the marginal change in the probability of
using derivatives resulting from a change in the independent v ariable. The marginal effects of the regressors on the
probabilities are calculated as:
I =A
-A
, where
= dichotomous dependent variable; Xi = ith
independent variable; x = v ector of independent variables; A = the logistic cumulative distribution function; andz = vector of
coefficient estimates.
I
is calculated at the means of the regressors. t-statistics are for the logit coefficients. Summary
statistics for thelogit regression are presented in Panel B

a a

y

a a

P ane l A

L og1.1 regresswn est nn a es

V ariable
Constant
Managerial wealth
Managerial option ownership
Tax-loss carryforwards/
total ass ets
Long-term debt ratio OE AV)
Book-to-market ratio if3M_)
DE_AV*(lA3M)
R&D expenses/sales (RD)
DE AV*(RD)
Quick ratio
N umber of analyst firms
Firm size
Pretax foreign income/
total sales
Firm has foreign denominated
debt
Percentage of imports in 4-digit
S IC industry
Firm uses other derivatives
Industry Indicator Variables:
Conswner Goods
Electronics
Energy
Metals
N on-Durable Cons. G oods
Paper
Production Materials
TrariSportation

Predicted Sign:
S& S FS S D&D
Coeff.
NA NA NA -4.6341
NA
NA
0.018
+
- NA NA 0.062
+
- NA 0.401

+

+

NA

-

-

-

+
+
+

+
+
+

+
+
+

-

-

NA

NA
?

NA
?

-

-1.416
-0.052
0.561 10

Full Sample
(N = 282)

eN

!1 Prob .
-1.154
0.004
0.016
0. 100

t-stat.
-2.709
0.156
0.916
0.1 74

-0.353
-0.013
0. 140

-1.1 72
-0.109
1.854

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.1 32

0.032

-

-

-

-

-

-

28.6101
-43.603
-1.921 1
0.047

0.086

0.6001
15.527 5

6.976
-10.632
-0.468
0.0 11
0.146
3.786

2.466
-1.2 14
-2.497
1.432
3.087
2.028

+

0.066 1
0.7261
8.67 110

-0.229
0.016
0.181
2. 159

-1.541
2.606
4.380
1.745

?

0.7765

0.193

2.434

1.2391

0.302

3.086

+

0.053 1

0.013

3.591

0.0601

0.015

3.356

?

0.7365

0.183

2.068

1.307 1

0.319

2.898

?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?

0.572

0.142

0.857

1.230

0.300

1.421

-

-

-

-

-

-

-0.919

Partial Sample: RD Available
= 220\
Coeff.
t-stat.
!1 Prob.
-1.550
-3 .094
-6.3591
0.045
0.011
0.333
0.107
0.026
1.2 16
2.992
0.729
1.307

-1.495 5
-0 .503
-0.264
-0.822
0.466
0.296

-0.372
-0.125
-0.263
-0.205
0. 116
0.074

-2. 116
-0.723
-0.396
-1.294
0.829
0.592

-0.025
0.707
0.5 17
-0.3 19
1.049
0.615

-0.606
0.172
0.126
-0.078
0.226
0.150

-

-0.022
0.803
0.554
-0.381
1.573
1.063
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T able IV (continued)
P ane1 B S urnrn arv Sta t I S t l CS f,or L Ogll't R egresswns
Number of Observations
Actual Dependent V ariable:
0 (Discloses no use of currency
derivatives)
1 (Discloses use of currency derivatives)
Total
Log Likelihood at convergence
Restricted Log Likelihood: Slopes = 0
-2*(Log Likelihood Ratio)/(degrees of freedom)
1 5 10
( ) { lsig nificant

Full Sample
Predicted Dependent V ariable:
0
1
Total
148
117
31
39
156

95
126
-1 32.4 1
-1 95.1 2
125.411(20

134
282

at the 1% (5%) {10%} significance level for a two-tailed test.

Partial Sample
Predicted Dependent V ariable:
0
1
Total
24
77
101
25
102

94
118
-95.72
-1 5 1.76
112.08/(20)

119
220
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Table V I
Frequency of Use of Foreign C urrency Derivative Instrum ents by Instrument Type
Frequency of use of selected foreign currency derivative instruments by 372 large U.S. industrial firms that have
foreign ex change rate exposure as of fiscal year-end 1990. Companies are among the 500 largest firms (by sales)
in the Fortune 500. A firm has foreign exchange rate exposure if it has nonzero foreign pretax income, positiv e
foreign sales or debt, or is in the upper quartile of the sample firms on the basis of imports as a percentage of total
industry sales. Panel A reports the frequency of use of different types of foreign currency derivatives for all firms.
Panel B reports the frequency of derivatives use by type of foreign exchange rate exposure. N one of the means of
the proxy variables are significantly different across the choice between "Currency swaps and swap combinations"
and "Currency forwards and forward combinations." t-tests assume equal variances unless the null hypothesis of
equal variances is rejected at a 10% significance level.

Panel A: Derivative instrument choice

N

N o currency
instrument
2 18

Currency swaps and
swap combinations
45

Currency forwards and
forward combinations
109

Total
372

%

58. 6

12.1

29.3

100.0

PanelB: Exposure to operating, financing, and competitive risk by derivative instrument choice
N o currency
instrument

Currency swaps and
swap combinations

N

Mean

N

Mean

Foreign pretax
income/ total sale

165

0 .0 171

44

Foreign & export
sales/total sales

14 1

0 .2824

Identifiable
foreign assets/
total assets

11 6

Currency forwards and
forward combinations

Total

N

Mean

N

0 .029Ql0

105

0 .034&

314

42

0 .387g;

99

0 .39021

282

0 .3505

39

0.3548

99

0 .3432

254

41

0 .0258

36

0.05435

43

0 .0361

120

25

0 .0281

10

0 .0255

22

0 .0328

57

12.03%

45

14.24%

109

17.22%1

372

Operation s:

For eign debt:
Foreign long-tern
debt /total assets
Foreign short-terr
debt/
total
assets
Competitive:
Percentage of
imports in 4-digit
SIC industry
1 (5)

2 18

{lO}Significantly different from the choice of no currency instrument at the 1 (5) { 10} % level, respectively.
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T able V
P ear son C orrelation Coefficients
Pearson correlation coefficients for explanatory variables used in the logit and multinomial logit regressions
(expressed in percentages). Variables are as follows: NOL is tax-loss carryforwards scaled by total assets.
COV_A V is interest coverage ratio. DE_A Vis long-term debt ratio. SIZE is log of firm size. MG RWL TH is log
of the marl<:et value of common shares beneficially owned (excluding options) by officers and directors as a group.
OPTS is log of the marl<:et value of managerial option ownership. RD is the ratio research and development
expenses to total sales. PPE is the ratio of plant, property, and equipment inv estment expenditures to SIZE. BM is
the book to market ratio. CONY is the ratio of convertible debt to SIZE. PS is the ratio of preferred stock to SIZ E.
QUICK_A V is the quick ratio. DIV _A V is the dividend yield. 10 is institutional ownership. ANLST is number
of analyst firms.
NOL
COV AV

-6. 2%

DE AV

14. d

COV AV DE A V

SIZE

MGRWLTI-

OPTS

-1 1.75

0 .7

-7 .3

MGRWLTH

-1 4.51

2 1.31

-33.91

31.61

OPTS

-1.8

2.4

-13.1

5

36.9 1

3.1

RD

11.410

2.2

-32.41

11.85

11.3

15.3 5

PPE

8.i 0

-7.5

32.91

-5.1

-30.31

-9.310

BM

0. 0

-9 . 110

36.51

-19. 21

-23.31

CON Y

27 .1

1

-6.8

17.91

-17. 01

-8.5

PS

16.81

-5.2

14.91

-3.5

-22.91

3.7

11.35

-20.91

3.4

21 .71

-6.7

6 .5

2 1.41

-3.3

DIV A V
IO
ANLST

PPE

BM

CONY

PS

-24.71

SIZE

QUICK_AV

RD

5

-6.5

40 .01

-4.0

11.410

5 .4

15.21

-9.610

-1.4

20 .31

7. 1

-4.3

-12.55

30.3 1

-1 5.61

-1.4

5.2

-2 .4

-10.7 5

-7.6

-1 4.0S

4.0

-34.41

-6. 7

- 1.9

25.i

27.5 1

-5 .6

-4.6

-1 5.71

-7 .5

4 1.91

32.6 1

4.3

-1 5.61

-1 r. SS

-3.3

-1 1. 1

-9 .010

-24.d

15.7 1

-11.45

-5.3

0 .2

-19.81

8 1.4 1

22.01

5

-13.2

-2 3.51

1 (5) { 10}Statistically different from zero at the 1% (5% ) { 10% } significance level.
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T a ble VII
M ultinomial Logit E stimates ofthe Lik elihood of Using Different Classes of Currency Derivativ es
Multinomial logit estimates of the relation between the likelihood that a finn chooses one of two categories of derivative
strategies and variables measuring hedging incentives in fiscal year 199 1 for 220 largeU.S. industrial firms with foreign
exchange rate exposure. This sample represents all finns that have research and development (R&D) expense data.
Companies are among the 500 largest firms (by sales) in theFortune 500. A finn has foreign exchange rate exposure if it has
nonzero foreign pretax income, positive foreign sales or debt, or is in the upper quartile of the sample finns on the basis of
imports as a percentage of total industry sales (i.e., high import competition). Classes of currency derivatives choices presented
in the table are expressed relative to the choice of not using currency derivatives. Choice 1 refers to using currency swaps only
or currency swaps in combination with forwards, futures and options (Swaps Only and Swap Combinations). Choice 2 refers to
using foreign exchange forwards only or using foreign exchange forwards in combination with foreign exchange futures or
options (Forwards Only and Forward Combinations). i1Prob. measures the marginal change in the probability of making
Choice 1 or Choice 2 resulting from a change in the independent variable, calculated at the means of theregressors. The tstatistics are for the coefficient estimates. SlllTlmary statistics for themultinominallogit regressions are presented in Panel B.

. om1a
. 1Log1t Estrmates
Pane A: Mu1tm

Derivative Instrument Choice
Choice 1
Swaps Only and Swap Combinations

For ward s Only a1

(N =35)

Coefficient
-10.001 1

Constant

f.Prob

t-statistic

-0.623

-3.296

Coefficient
-3.68610

Managerial wealth
Managerial option ownership

-0.337

-0. 029

-1.57 3

0 .098

-0.098

-0.016

-0 .996

Tax loss carry forwards/total assets
Long-term debt ratio
R&D expensesfotal sales

0.538
-3 .96310

-0. 045

0 .099

0 .22SS
2 .245

12.50 1

-0.306
-0.036

-1.672
0 .816

7.157

1.778

0 .12 8

-0.148

-2. 05 1

-0. 004

-0.47 9

0.075

3 .933

Long-term debt ratio
Quick ratio

* R&D expenses

Analyst firms
Firm size

5

-2.886
-0.020
1.1841
5

0 .088
25.9615
-32.3 14
-1.90510
0 .05510
0 .39i 0

Foreign pretax income/total sales
Long-term foreign debt /total assets

21.338
0.000

0.955

1.92 6

-0.000

0 .408

17 .65g5
0 .00 1

Short-term foreign debt/total assets
Firm has high import competition

-0.002

-0.000

-0.617

-0 .002

0.003

2 .318

0.139

3.40 3

Firm uses other derivatives

5

0.056
2.2 151

0.04d
0 .78i 0
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P anel B. Summary Statistics for M u ltinomial Logit Regression
Number of Observations
A ctual Dependent V ariable:
0 (Does not disclose the use of currency derivatives)
1 (Discloses using currency swaps only or currency swap
combinations)
2 (Discloses using forwards only or forwards combinations)
Total
Log Likelihood at convergence
Restricted Log Likelihood: Slopes = 0
-2 *(Log Likelihood Ratio)/(degrees of freedom)
1 (5) { 10 }Significant

at the 1% (5%) {10%} significance level for a two-tailed test.

0
83
7
25
115

Predicted Dependent Va
1
2
4
14
18
10
8
30

51
75

-151.57
-223.85
144.55/(28)
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Endnotes
See, for example, Smith and>tulz ( 1985) andFroot, Scharfstein, and Stein ( 1993 ).
1

Breeden and Viswanathan (1996) and DeMarzo and Duffie ( 1995) develop models in which

managerial reputation provides incentives for managers to use derivatives. U sing our sample,
specific testable implications of the these models are difficult to implement.
2

Financial statement amounts include the effects of interest rate derivative products. Therefore,

COV_AV and DE_AV measure post derivative-use coverage and leverage, respectively. This
measurement may overstate or understate pre-hedging exposure to financial distress.

Our

preferred measure of COV_AV is unhedged interest expense; our preferred measure of DE_AV
is the av erage market v alue of debt. N either of these measures, however, is available.
3

Expected taxes and the expected availability of internal cash flows are negatively related.

Consequently, decreasing expected taxes indirectly increases the availability of internal funds. We
interpret the FSS model to imply that firms facing a convex tax function will hedge less, ceteris

p aribus.
4

Following the Nance et al. procedure, we classify 55 percent of our sample fmns as having a high

probability of operating in the progressive tax region. None of the firms, however, realize income
subject to a progressive tax.
5

Translation adjustments on assets and liabilities in place or transaction gains and losses represent

the ex post impact of currency value changes, not the total dollars at risk.

These data are

av ailable only for a limited number of firms in our sample (145 observations).
6

These data are collected by reading segment-reporting footnotes and other disclosures within the

annual report. We also include export sales when disclosed.
7

There are only three ftrms with foreign exchange-rate exposure based only on IIVIPORTS. To

check the robustness of our results to our competitive exposure classification, we also include
fmns with IMPORTS greater than the median. This results in 18 additional sample firms but does
not change the empirical results.
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8

0nly two firms have foreign-denominated debt but no operating exposure. N either fum discloses

using currency derivatives .
9

W e also estimate the logit regresswns without industry indicator variables because of the

potential overlap between II'v1PORTS, which is based on the four-digit SIC classification, and the
industry indicator variables that are based on Fortune 's industry classifications. The results are
qualitatively similar, except that DE_A V is negative and significant at the 10 percent significance
level for the full sample.
1

<Due to high correlations between analyst following and fum stze, and managerial option

ownership and fum size (see Table V), we use the residuals from a separate regression of each
variable on SIZE, standardized by its predicted value, as a measure of analyst following and
managerial option ownership, respectively, in the logit regression.

In addition, where other

independent variables are highly correlated we test the joint significance of groups of coefficients.
Based on these F-tests, the conclusions are unchanged.
11

We thank Michaell3rennan for sug gesting this alternative explanation.

12

See, for example, Titman (1992) and Minton ( 1994) for models in which the choice of interest

rate derivatives use is made simultaneously with the choice of the type of debt fmancing.

See

Kim and Titman (1996) for a discussion about the choice of managerial compensation structure
and derivatives use.
13

G ilson (1989), andGilson andV etsuypens ( 1993) find evidence that managerial tenure and

compensation is affected by financial distress.
14

The multinomiallogit regressions presented in Section V also are subject to this criticism . For

these regressions, we perform robustness checks of our variable specification similar to those
discussed here, and the results are qualitativ ely similar
15

See Titman (1992) andMinton (1994) for models examining capital structure choice in the

presence of interest-rate deriv ativ e instruments.
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16

As a robustness check, we also estimate the model using BM as our measure of growth

opportunities. The results, not presented, are qualitatively the same.

